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Litigation Funding Is an Ethically Risky
Proposition for Attorneys and Clients
By CAROL LANGFORD*
ALL LITIGATION REQUIRES some degree of financing, either by
the parties themselves or, in the case of a contingency or pro bono
case, by the firm extending credit and expense against the future pro-
ceeds of settlement or judgment. Some clients, however, lack the re-
sources to fund litigation, regardless of the potential final award, or
have medical or living expenses that must be paid before the suit is
resolved and which the plaintiff’s attorney cannot pay on the client’s
behalf.1
Alternative or third-party litigation funding is not new. Third-
party litigation funding was historically classified as champerty, and its
related generally-outlawed practices of maintenance, usury, and barra-
try.2 “Put simply, maintenance is helping another prosecute a suit;
champerty is maintaining a suit in return for a financial interest in the
outcome; and barratry is a continuing practice of maintenance or
champerty.”3 Champerty in particular is “[a]n agreement between an
officious intermeddler in a lawsuit and a litigant by which the inter-
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1. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(e) (2013) (“A lawyer shall not provide
financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litiga-
tion . . . .”); CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4-210(A) (2013).
2. See Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61, 70 (2011).
3. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 424 n.15 (1978).
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meddler helps pursue the litigant’s claim as consideration for receiv-
ing part of any judgment proceeds.”4
The concept of third-party funding originated in ancient
Greece,5 then later emerged in Australia6 and England during the
Middle Ages.7 In the 1990s, Americans began utilizing third-party
funding as a way to give a few thousand dollars to plaintiffs.8 This “law
lending”9 funded relatively small consumer suits, typically in matters
relating to personal injury or divorce.10 Currently, twenty-seven out of
fifty-one jurisdictions—including Arizona, Colorado, California, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, Texas, and D.C.—permit some form of
champerty, so long as there is no intermeddling with how the litiga-
tion is conducted, the suit is not frivolous, and there is no malice
champerty at play.11 Defined generally by the American Bar Associa-
tion (ABA), third-party litigation funders “provide capital used to sup-
port litigation-related activities, or to support clients’ ordinary living
expenses during the pendency of litigation.”12 Unlike traditional liti-
gation funding from clients or firms, these sources of funding stretch
into the realm of personal financing during the period when a client
is engaged in litigation, and reach beyond support of the case itself.
Alternative Litigation Funding (ALF) can come in various forms.
Consumer-based ALF typically targets personal-injury plaintiffs, and
other clients with smaller claims.13 In this type of ALF, the funder
4. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 279 (10th ed. 2014).
5. See Ari Dobner, Litigation for Sale, 144 U. PENN. L. REV. 1529, 1543 (1996).
6. Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding, 95 MINN.
L. REV. 1268, 1279 (2011).
7. Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 48, 60 (1935).
8. Terry Carter, Cash Up Front, ABA JOURNAL (Oct. 8, 2004), http://abajournal.com/
magazine/article/cash_up_front/.
9. Maya Steinitz, The Litigation Finance Contract, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 455, 460
(2012).
10. See Steven Garber, Alternative Litigation Financing in the United States, RAND CORP.
9-10 (2010), http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP306.pdf.
11. ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, Informational Report to the House of Delegates,
at 11 (2011). See also Sebok, supra note 2, at 104-05 (“[M]alice champerty [is] ‘the funding
of frivolous litigation by an otherwise disinterested party, with the purpose of harming or
discomforting the defendant.’”). Non-frivolous litigation is defined as
[W]here the claim is based on (a) factual allegations that the plaintiff has a rea-
sonable basis for believing could be proven true, and (b) law which the plaintiff
has reason to believe a court could interpret in such a way so as to support a result
in the plaintiff’s favor.
Id. at 105.
12. ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, Informational Report to the House of Delegates,
at 5 (2011).
13. Id. at 6.
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takes a partial percentage of a claim that is not yet settled.14 Alterna-
tively, commercial ALF lenders generally supply loans or lines of
credit to lawyers or law firms as opposed to taking an interest in a
claim from clients.15
The funding of class actions and other high-end litigation like
patent matters also often no longer comes from the firm itself or a law
firm line of credit.16 Third-party litigation funders have seen the prof-
its to be made and increased their funding efforts.17 Alan Zimmer-
man, CEO and Co-CIO/Legal Counsel of LawFinance Group,18 stated
that he funded “$9 million in financings during Thanksgiving week
alone, even with time off for turkey and stuffing.”19 Mr. Zimmerman,
his company, and other similar companies view financing litigation as
an investment.20
ALF is booming, and even investment funds are becoming in-
volved in this practice.21 This method of funding is largely unexam-
ined, and it is currently unregulated by the federal government.22
Surprisingly, there is little to no guidance for lawyers regarding the
ethical issues that arise from working with third-party litigation
funders in California.
Interest rates for loans can vary from 2.5-15%, compounded
monthly.23 What are the lawyer’s duties regarding advising the client
that a typical interest charge of 2.94% compounded monthly24 can
14. Id.
15. Id. at 8.
16. See id.
17. See Garber, supra note 10, at 24-25.
18. Alan L. Zimmerman, LAW FINANCE GROUP, http://www.lawfinance.com/person/
alan-zimmerman/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2014).
19. Paul M. Barrett, Litigation Funder Adds Fuel to the BP Lawsuit Conflagration, BLOOM-
BERG BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 3, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-12-03/liti
gation-funder-adds-fuel-to-the-bp-lawsuit-conflagration.
20. See Stuart L. Pardau, Alternative Litigation Financing: Perils and Opportunities, 12 U.C.
DAVIS BUS. L.J. 65, 67 (2011).
21. See, e.g., Garber, supra note 10, at 8; William Alden, Litigation Finance Firm Raises
$260 Million for New Fund, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/
01/12/litigation-finance-firm-raises-260-million-for-new-fund/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r
=1.
22. ALF is not regulated by the federal government, and only Maine, Ohio, Nebraska,
and New York adopt some form of ALF regulation within their respective states. See Ter-
rence Cain, Third Party Funding of Personal Injury Tort Claims: Keep the Baby and Change the
Bathwater, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 11, 14 (2014).
23. Martin J. Estevao, The Litigation Financing Industry: Regulation to Protect and Inform
Consumers, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 467, 475 (2013).
24. Carol M. Langford, Viewpoint: Time to Shine a Light on Litigation Funding, RECORDER
(Mar. 6, 2014), http://www.therecorder.com/id=1202645951261/Viewpoint-Time-to-
Shine-a-Light-on-Litigation-Funding.
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end up being around 40% of the loan amount or more per year?
Some loan agreements specify that the funder is entitled to the full
judgment award if it is less than the amount financed, and not all
agreements state that attorney’s fees must be paid before the third-
party litigation funders.25 There is also a confidentiality risk if oppos-
ing counsel asks a client in an interrogatory if his case was funded.26 If
the client says yes, the opposing counsel may claim the right to view all
documents the firm gave the funder, and to know everything the cli-
ent and his lawyer said to the funder.27
Part I of this Article examines case law as well as bar association
opinions regarding the attorney-client privilege when dealing with
third-party litigation funders. Part II provides a hypothetical scenario
demonstrating how ALF can present unexpected ethical issues for un-
wary lawyers. Part III discusses the arguments made by supporters of
ALF, and subsequently casts doubt as to their strength. Part IV out-
lines another hypothetical situation designed to raise questions about
a lawyer’s ability to competently represent a client when dealing with
third-party litigation funders. Part V argues that ALF needs to be regu-
lated going forward. Part V also offers as potential solutions new state
bar regulations, detailed attorney-client agreements, explicit con-
tracting provisions that treat third-party litigation funders like insur-
ance companies, and federal regulations. This Article concludes by
emphasizing that lawyers have an obligation to act in their client’s best
interests and must be aware of the potential conflicts of interests that
emerge when deciding to engage in ALF.
I. Gaps in Authority Regarding the Attorney-Client Privilege
Few courts have opined on the confidentiality of the funding pro-
cess, but Leader Technologies, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc.,28 Dodd v. Cruz,29 eth-
ics opinions from the New York City Bar Association,30 and an ABA
informational report issued by the Ethics 20/20 Commission suggest
that lawyers must be mindful of waiving the attorney-client privilege.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See 32 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts 189 (1995) (explaining that information and docu-
ments shared with a third party can be subject to discovery if the attorney-client privilege is
waived).
28. 719 F. Supp. 2d 373, 376 (D. Del. 2010).
29. 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d 601, 605 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014).
30. N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2011-2 (2011), available at
http://www.nycbar.org/ethics/ethics-opinions-local/2011-opinions/1159-formal-opinion-
2011-02.
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These authorities also remind attorneys to be aware of conflicts of in-
terest and the duty of loyalty to the client.31
A. Leader Technologies, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc.
Leader Technologies, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc. illustrates the risk to attor-
neys and their clients in sharing privileged information with a third-
party litigation funder. Leader Technologies was a patent infringement
case brought by Leader Technologies against Facebook.32 Leader
Technologies shared privileged technical documents with a litigation
financing company,33 and the magistrate judge compelled production
of these documents.34 Leader Technologies asserted that the docu-
ments were protected under the common legal interest privilege.35
The common legal interest, Leader asserted, was the company’s inter-
est in financing the litigation, and the documents were shared only
after the company provided the litigation funding.36 The court was
not persuaded by Leader Technologies’ privilege claim.37 In order to
give “sufficient force” to a common interest claim of privilege, there
must be a demonstration that “the disclosures would not have been
made but for the sake of securing, advancing, or supplying legal rep-
resentation.”38 Further, for a communication to be protected, the in-
terests must be “identical, not similar, and be legal, not solely
commercial.”39 Consequently, the court found that Leader Technolo-
31. See Dodd, 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 606–07 n.3 (“MedFi has taken the position that the
amount of its lien is the full amount of Coast’s bill, and that it expects to be paid by Dodd
for the full amount regardless of what a trier of fact decides is the reasonable value of
Coast’s services. This appears to raise a conflict of interest for Dodd’s attorney.”); N.Y.C.
Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2011-2 (“A conflict also may arise in the
event the lawyer is asked to advise the client about financing when the client cannot afford
to commence or continue litigation absent a third party advance of the lawyer’s fees.”);
ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, Informational Report to the House of Delegates, at 39
(2011) (“Lawyers must adhere to principles of professional independence, candor, compe-
tence, undivided loyalty, and confidentiality when representing clients in connection with
ALF transactions.”).
32. Leader Technologies, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 2d at 375.
33. Id. at 376.
34. Id. at 375.
35. “The common interest doctrine is an exception to the general rule that the attor-




38. Id. (quoting In re Regents of Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d 1386, 1389 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(internal quotation omitted)).
39. Id. (quoting In re Regents, 101 F.3d at 1390).
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gies waived its privilege claim by sharing information with a third-
party litigation funder.40
B. Dodd v. Cruz
Dodd v. Cruz also illustrates the risk of waiving any potential privi-
lege in documents by sharing them with a third-party funder, as well
as the conflict of interest that an attorney places onto himself by mak-
ing an independent financial investment in a client’s legal action. In
Dodd, the plaintiff received post-accident surgery paid for by a third-
party. The payment secured a medical lien against his litigation
claim.41 The president of the third-party company, which bought the
lien from the health care provider, was the plaintiff’s attorney.42 The
conflict of interest created was that the attorney now had two mutually
exclusive fiduciary duties: his fiduciary duty to his company to collect
as much as possible from the client on the lien,43 and his duty of loy-
alty to his client to reduce the amount of the lien and achieve the best
litigation outcome.44
Although the third-party lender stated in court documents that it
expected all debtor-plaintiffs to pay the full book value of the health
care provider’s charges, regardless of the litigation’s outcome, noth-
ing in the court’s record indicated that the plaintiff was aware of that
expectation or had agreed to it.45 The defendant filed a motion to
access the funding agreement between the plaintiff and the third
party, so as to assess the plaintiff’s reasonable damages.46 The third-
party litigation funder objected to the production of documents re-
lated to its “lien contracts” on the grounds that they were “confiden-
tial, proprietary and irrelevant.”47 However, the court held that the
information was discoverable, regardless of any privilege the lender or
plaintiff might assert, because it was reasonably calculated to lead to
discoverable information on the rational value of the medical services
40. Id.
41. Dodd v. Cruz, 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d 601, 603-04 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014).
42. Id. at 604.
43. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 617 (10th ed. 2014) (“A duty of utmost good faith,
trust, confidence, and candor owed by a fiduciary (such as a lawyer or corporate officer) to
the beneficiary (such as a lawyer’s client or a shareholder); a duty to act with the highest
degree of honesty and loyalty toward another person and in the best interests of the other
person (such as the duty that one partner owes to another).”).
44. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (2013); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(2) (2013).
45. Dodd, 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 604.
46. Id. at 606.
47. Id. at 604.
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administered to the plaintiff.48 The documents were particularly rele-
vant because they might have revealed that the plaintiff was not actu-
ally responsible for the costs incurred,49 or that the value of the
medical care was less than the amount of the lien, as the lien would
have also accounted for the costs of lending.50
C. Association of the Bar of the City of New York Formal Ethics
Opinion 2011-2
The Association of the Bar of the City of New York Committee on
Professional Ethics Formal Opinion 2011-2 (the “New York Opinion”)
specifically addresses the ethical concerns and safeguards attorneys
should take when their clients are accessing ALF, specifically regard-
ing non-recourse loans.51 Non-recourse loans in this context are re-
payable by the litigant out of the proceeds of settlement or judgment
awards. The financiers are entitled to repayment as well as special
fees, often a percentage of the total settlement or award.52 In general,
non-recourse debt or loans do not allow the lender to seek recovery
for anything more than the collateral used to secure the loan, and the
borrower is not held personally liable for the debt.53
As the New York Opinion illustrates, in determining whether to
fund a given action, the third-party litigation funder must contact the
claimant’s attorney for confidential and privileged information re-
garding the case.54 The funding agreement may also require periodic
updates from the attorney and access to the client’s file as terms of the
funding contract.55 According to the New York Opinion, it is the law-
yer’s duty to advise the client against entering into an agreement that
is de facto unlawful because it is champertous or charges usurious
48. Id. at 609.
49. Id. at 608.
50. Id.
51. N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2011-2 (2011), available at
http://www.nycbar.org/ethics/ethics-opinions-local/2011-opinions/1159-formal-opinion-
2011-02; see also Non-Recourse Debt, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/
nonrecoursedebt.asp (last visited Sept. 25, 2014) (“A type of loan that is secured by collat-
eral, which is usually property.”).
52. N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2011-2.
53. Recourse vs. Non-recourse Debt, IRS U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, http://apps.irs.gov/
app/vita/content/36/36_02_020.jsp?level=advanced (last visited Nov. 2, 2014).
54. N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2011-2.
55. Id. (citing The Funding Process, LAWMAX LEGAL FINANCE, http://litigationfinancing.
com/the-funding-process/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2011) (“We . . . ask . . . that we be kept aware
of any developments in the case.”)).
244 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49
rates.56 Whether ALF funding can be usurious or champertous is not
yet settled.
Additionally, if the attorney is recommending a funding source,
the lawyer should discuss with the client the costs and benefits of a
non-recourse loan, and highlight the limitations on a client’s actual
recovery due to loan repayment and percentage-fees combined with
the existing costs and fees of litigation.57
With regard to conflicts of interest, the New York Opinion fo-
cuses on the fundamental ethical tenent that an attorney cannot put
his own interests above the client’s.58 In addition to third-party litiga-
tion funders paying a client’s personal, medical, and living expenses,
it can be safely assumed that the attorney’s fees and costs of litigation
are also paid out of these funds.59 If the client cannot legitimately
begin or continue litigation, the attorney’s duty of candor compels a
frank discussion with the client about ALF, even if the client ulti-
mately does not pursue the litigation.
The vulnerability of the attorney-client privilege is readily appar-
ent in ALF because attorneys share client information to obtain fi-
nancing. While the question of whether sharing client and case
information with a third-party funder waives privilege and confidenti-
ality is not definitively settled, but the argument that the common in-
terest privilege does not apply to a strictly financial interest in the
litigation’s outcome is persuasive, as shown above in Leader Technolo-
gies and Dodd.60 For very large claims, third-party litigation funders ad-
ditionally often reserve the right to further disclose the case and the
client’s information to additional third-party financiers.61 The New
York Opinion cautions that the third-party disclosure cannot ethically
occur without the client’s informed consent,62 which brings the attor-
ney back to the duty of candor with the client about the potential risks
in ALF.
The final ethical concern raised in the New York Opinion is per-
haps the most threatening to a client’s interests in litigation: losing
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(2) (2013) (explaining that
an impermissible concurrent conflict of interest is created if there is a significant risk that
the lawyer’s representation will be materially limited by a personal interest of the lawyer).
59. See ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, Informational Report to the House of Dele-
gates, at 5 (2011).
60. See supra Part I.A-B.
61. N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2011-2.
62. Id.
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control over the legal proceeding. In order to maximize its return, a
third-party litigation funder may object to steps that would benefit the
client if it would either reduce the potential award or settlement
amount, or increase litigation costs and diminish the available profit
margin.63 The client may consent to this intermeddling, however, it is
the responsibility of the attorney to act on her client’s behalf, ensur-
ing that he is apprised of what he may be giving up in exchange for
this type of non-recourse financing.64
D. ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 Informational Report on
Alternative Litigation Funding
The ABA’s Commission on Ethics 20/20 Informational Report
(the “Informational Report”) is currently the most comprehensive re-
port on the ethical issues of ALF. However, the Informational Report
suffers from the same defects as other ethics opinions: it examines the
problems, but does not resolve or offer definite solutions to any of the
risks posed by ALF. The Informational Report discusses (1) conflicts
of interest;65 (2) interference with an attorney’s independent profes-
sional judgment;66 (3) implicit interference in the plaintiff’s calcula-
tion of whether to settle a claim and for how much;67 (4)
confidentiality, privilege, and work product;68 (5) reasonableness of
fees when costs of financing may be passed along to the client;69 and
(6) the ethical entanglements when the attorney either recommends
ALF, or obtains a personal financial interest in the outcome of the
claim because of an investment through a third-party litigation
funder.70 An attorney’s involvement in the funding process could
limit the attorney’s capacity for undivided client advocacy and would
require the client’s informed consent to the attorney’s representa-
tion.71 Withdrawal from representation would leave the client in no
better position because of the costs associated with starting over with a
new attorney, but the attorney would be free from the ethical dilem-
mas presented by ALF.
63. Id.
64. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 13 (2013).
65. ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, Informational Report to the House of Delegates,
at 15 (2011).
66. Id. at 25-26.
67. Id. at 27-29.
68. Id. at 30-36.
69. Id. at 36-38.
70. Id. at 24-26.
71. Id. at 39.
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Avoiding ALF is not a long-term solution, as the ABA’s Commis-
sion on Ethics 20/20 (the “Commission”) recognizes. The Commis-
sion concludes that because the market demands this type of
financing, transactions between third-party litigation funders, clients,
and attorneys will continue to evolve and exist.72 Nevertheless, the
Commission determined that attorneys must adhere to the core ethi-
cal duties of professional independence, candor, undivided loyalty,
competence, and confidentiality.73 The crux of the conflict is how an
attorney can actually continue to adhere to those ethical loyalties
while engaging in ALF transactions. The discussion does not offer any
applicable, practical advice on how to meet market demands while
adhering simultaneously to these ethical duties. The Informational
Report identifies the relevant ethics issues ALF creates, provides sev-
eral hypothetical scenarios,74 and lists the relevant ABA Rules that ap-
ply to third-party litigation funders. However, it does not offer any
practical guidance to practitioners beyond a caution that attorneys
“not experienced in dealing with these funding transactions” become
fully informed, either through study or by partnering with more ex-
perienced counsel.75 In a field that the Informational Report acknowl-
edges as a “still-evolving industry,”76 even purportedly experienced
attorneys operate under scant guidance on regulation, hence impair-
ing their licenses and their client’s interests in the process.
II. Scenarios Presenting Potential Conflicts of Interest
Even when provided guidance from the Informational Report
and available opinions, questions remain unanswered. In addition to
the scenarios in the example cases and advisory sources, ALF is in-
fested with other potential conflicts of interests for the unwary lawyer.
Among them are conflicts with the following circumstances:
• When the attorney provides a letter identifying the worth of
the claim;
• When the client wants to settle for quick cash while the lawyer




74. Id. at 13-15.
75. Id. at 4.
76. Id. at 3.
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• Where a lender wants to prolong the litigation to recover on
their investment and refuses to allow the client to settle by
forcing the settlement issue to arbitration;
• Where so much interest is owed that the lawyer simply cannot
settle and has to try for more at trial;
• Where funding is withdrawn and the attorney cannot afford to
fund the discovery needed to prepare the case;
• When the lawyer may recover his fee but the client could po-
tentially recover nothing because of what the client owes in
interest.
How do these conflicts arise? Imagine that Clare Client, who was
injured in a car accident, hires Laura Lawyer. Laura has calculated the
damages for which Clare can reasonably sue and the costs of bringing
suit. Laura determines that the case is meritorious, as she is likely to
prevail at trial or settle for an amount sufficient to cover Clare’s dam-
ages and her attorney’s fees. If the case runs a typical course, Laura
will be able to take the case on a contingency fee. Laura knows that
she ethically cannot pay Clare’s current bills and expenses, even
though Clare is unable to work, and Clare cannot obtain traditional
financing due to her poor credit. In order to maintain her mortgage
and other bills, Clare contacts a third-party consumer legal funder
that caters to plaintiff’s litigation clients. Two scenarios could then
occur: (1) Clare enters into a contractual financing agreement with
the lender without consulting Laura, or (2) she consults with Laura,
but Laura is unfamiliar with this type of financing. In order to help
Clare secure the financing, Laura provides the third-party litigation
funder her estimate of what the case is worth. Laura fails to scrutinize
the contract for elements that would run contrary to her ethical du-
ties, knowing only that her client needs to pay her bills while litigation
is pending on her valid claim.
In this hypothetical, neither Clare nor Laura understood that the
financing contract contains an enforceable provision giving the
lender the right to accept or reject settlement proposals.77 Contractu-
ally, this provision is valid, as it is part of the bargained-for exchange
and not necessarily unconscionable. However, it is a huge ethical
landmine for Laura. She unknowingly allows her client to exchange
control over the litigation and settlement for third-party funding with-
out advising Clare of the risks, as recommended by the ABA and ex-
77. See id. at 27-29.
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isting ethics opinions.78 Additionally, the terms of the financing
include the typical 2.94% compounded interest rate discussed earlier
in this Article.79 The interest starts to accrue on the money borrowed
from the third-party litigation funder, incentivizing Clare to quickly
settle. Laura accepted the case based on a monetary calculation that
did not include financing from the third-party litigation funder, and
now Laura is incentivized to press for a higher settlement in order to
minimize her mounting costs and interest. The third-party litigation
funder’s priority is to recoup its loan and fees, regardless of the cli-
ent’s interests or the attorney’s ethical obligations. Third-party litiga-
tion funding, as the ABA and California Rules of Professional
Conduct make clear, is allowed so long as it does not interfere with
the lawyer’s independent judgment or loyalty to the client.80 But the
focus for all parties—Clare, Laura, and the third-party litigation
funder—is now on settling as quickly as possible for as much as possi-
ble, in order to pay back the loan rather than to serve the interests of
the injured client.
This hypothetical shows how clients and lawyers can find them-
selves unexpectedly entangled with a third-party litigation funder in a
way that alters the course of the litigation. The Informational Report
provides several other examples of hypothetical situations an attorney
might encounter in the context of ALF. Additionally, it illustrates how
this type of funding stream can have irregular effects on the course of
litigation and settlement, due to and depending on the contractual
specifics of the funding agreement.81 At the ethical heart of these sce-
narios is an insurmountable conflict of interest between the lawyer
and the client. The lawyer’s duty of loyalty to the client is compro-
mised when the client goes into debt to maintain her litigation—and
to pay the attorney’s fees.
A. Ethical Issues in Alternative Litigation Funding of Low-End
Personal Injury Litigation
Litigation funding as an unregulated industry exacerbates ethical
issues. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) does not reg-
ulate this funding source, and it is unregulated by lender laws because
78. See id. at 28.
79. See Langford, supra note 24.
80. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8 cmt. 11 (2013); CAL. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 3-310(F)(1) (2013).
81. ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, Informational Report to the House of Delegates,
at 26-27 (2011); see also Steinitz, supra note 9, at 489-90.
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third-party litigation funders claim not to be lenders. As discussed in
the current scholarship, third-party litigation funders, particularly in
the consumer lending context, structure themselves to avoid usury
and champerty laws by charging fixed interest rates and issuing non-
recourse loans.82 These loans are not due unless the borrower
prevails, making them unlike traditional loans, thus falling outside of
the regulatory scheme of other types of lending. With the exception
of the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Rancman v. Interim Settlement
Funding Corp.,83 third-party litigation funders successfully argued in
court that neither champerty prohibitions nor usury laws apply to
non-recourse loans that are repayable solely out of litigation recov-
eries.84 In order to overturn the Rancman opinion, the American Le-
gal Financing Association (ALFA), the industry’s largest association
and lobbying group composed of thirty-one ALF companies,85 success-
fully lobbied the Ohio legislature to write a law overturning the lone
Ohio Supreme Court decision voiding an ALF contract as champerty
and maintenance.86 ALFA estimates that its members supply 90% of
the ALF currently in the market and that over 60% of those consum-
ers utilized this funding in order to avoid a client’s eviction or foreclo-
sure.87 While ALFA presents this as evidence of its beneficial and pro-
consumer purpose, a majority percentage of consumer-litigants de-
pendent on these financing agreements are in a weak bargaining posi-
tion, and the negative effects of making these deals should be
highlighted.
However, rather than falling under the existing regulatory sys-
tems for loans, ALFA presents ALF as a beneficial and self-regulating
industry. ALFA published a list of “Best Practices” for third-party litiga-
tion funders—a members’ “Code of Conduct.”88 According to this
“Code” members will not seek to own, interfere with, or participate in
82. See Jonathan T. Molot, Litigation Finance: A Market Solution to A Procedural Problem,
99 GEO. L.J. 65, 94 (2010).
83. 789 N.E.2d 217, 221 (Ohio 2003) (“[A] contract making the repayment of funds
advanced to a party to a pending case contingent upon the outcome of that case is void as
champerty and maintenance.”).
84. Molot, supra note 82, at 94-95.
85. AM. LEGAL FINANCE ASS’N, http://www.americanlegalfin.com/ (last visited Sept.
25, 2014).
86. Facts About ALFA, AM. LEGAL FINANCE ASS’N, http://www.americanlegalfin.com/
FactsAboutALFA.asp (last visited Sept. 28, 2014); see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.55
(West 2014).
87. Facts About ALFA, AM. LEGAL FINANCE ASS’N, supra note 86.
88. Industry Best Practices—ALFA’s Code of Conduct, AM. LEGAL FINANCE ASS’N, http://
www.americanlegalfin.com/IndustryBestPractices.asp (last visited Sept. 25, 2014).
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a consumer’s litigation and will not act to over-fund litigation or mis-
lead consumers.89 However, there is no apparent enforcement power
behind these “Best Practices,” and a survey of financing agreements in
ALF case law shows that participation, ownership, and otherwise inter-
meddling are written into the terms of the agreements. ALFA, posing
as a regulatory body, might be trying to avoid government regulation
in its untested, grey-area of money lending. Without guidance and en-
forcement from the state bar associations or the ABA, the unwary at-
torney is given no regulatory guidance. Lack of regulation exacerbates
any ethical dilemma, as it assumes lawyers are sophisticated dealers in
this type of funding—a problematic assumption given the variety and
evolution of funding products. Clients, often unsophisticated legal
consumers and usually unaware of an attorney’s ethical duties, do not
necessarily understand how problematic the loans can be. This, in
turn, complicates the ethics issues of attorney-client relations. Attor-
neys are placed in precarious situations as a result of their clients’
independent actions.
Lack of industry regulation is particularly problematic for clients
who have minimal personal funds to spend on litigation. Low-end
consumer litigation funders like Pegasus,90 Oasis,91 or USClaims92 ap-
pear to target the poor and injured, as evidenced by the websites’
headlines and content.93 Oasis’s website prominently displays testimo-
nials such as, “I really needed the money, me and my family had no
food,”94 or “The cash from Oasis has helped me not be homeless.”95
Pegasus’s website shows potential borrowers a hand full of money,
with the caption, “We can advance you cash today!”96 The overt, easy-
money salesmanship of these third-party litigation funders further
shows the importance of an attorney’s ethical obligations and the ne-
cessity of informing their clients of the costs, benefits, risks, and terms
of an agreement accompanying this kind of funding.
89. Id.
90. PEGASUS LEGAL FUNDING, http://www.mylawfunds.com/ (last visited Sept. 29,
2014).
91. OASIS LEGAL FINANCE, https://www.oasislegal.com/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2014).
92. USCLAIMS, http://www.usclaims.com/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2014).
93. See, e.g., What We Fund, USCLAIMS, http://www.usclaims.com/what-we-fund (last
visited Sept. 29, 2014) (listing common and workplace personal injury categories); Legal
Funding Resources, PEGASUS LEGAL FUNDING, http://www.mylawfunds.com/resources.html
(last visited Sept. 29, 2014) (“Bad Credit No Problem! No credit check necessary!”).
94. OASIS LEGAL FINANCE, supra note 91.
95. Id.
96. PEGASUS LEGAL FUNDING, supra note 90.
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B. Issues of Alternative Litigation Funding in High-End and
Complex Litigation
High-end funders that typically fund lawyers and law firms are
also involved in commercial cases. An example of a high-end commer-
cial funder is Gerchen Keller.97 Gerchen Keller funds corporations in
lawsuits and also assists parties in evaluating the “strengths and weak-
nesses of litigation claims or defenses, the potential costs of litigation,
the range of potential damage awards, and the expected economic
benefit or cost of maintaining particular claims or defenses.”98
The relevant ethical issue is whether Gerchen Keller can evaluate
a funding opportunity without comprising client confidentiality.
Gerchen Keller asserts that the company enters into a “consulting”
agreement with the party or law firm.99 “Thus, before any non-public
information is shared . . . we ensure that we share a common interest
in the litigation.”100
The argument that a third-party litigation funder falls under the
common interest privilege exception is less than foolproof.101 In Cali-
fornia, non-published information is considered confidential material
of both the attorney and the client.102 Describing a third-party litiga-
tion funder as a “consultant” is a strategy relating to Federal Rule of
Evidence 26, under which experts who are retained only as consul-
tants, and not as testifying experts, can be kept within the attorney-
client privilege.103 Labeled this way, third-party litigation funders can
make the argument that their interests in the case are legitimate and
non-adversarial, akin to sharing inside-information during a merger of
business interests,104 or between clients, attorneys, and insurance com-
97. GERCHEN KELLAR CAPITAL, http://www.gerchenkeller.com/ (last visited Sept. 29,
2014).
98. Our Underwriting Process, GERCHEN KELLAR CAPITAL, http://www.gerchenkeller.com
/what-we-do/our-underwriting-process/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2014).
99. Ethical and Regulatory Considerations, GERCHEN KELLAR CAPITAL, http://
www.gerchenkeller.com/what-we-do/ethical-regulatory-considerations/ (last visited Sept.
29, 2014).
100. Id.
101. See supra Part I.A-B.
102. See CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3-100 (2013).
103. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(B)-(C) (protecting documents and communications
between a party’s attorney if used to prepare for litigation). The attorney-client privilege
may be invoked with respect to: (1) a communication; (2) made between privileged per-
sons; (3) in confidence; and (4) for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal assistance
for the client. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 (2000).
104. Letter from Juridica Capital Management Ltd. to ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20,
Comments to Issues Paper Concerning Lawyer’s Involvement in Alt. Litig. Fin., at 66 (Feb.
2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_
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panies105 under a version of the common interest doctrine.106 Confi-
dential client information obtained by third-party litigation funders
during the financing process would therefore remain privileged and
protected from discovery requests. Furthermore, even without similar
exceptions gleaned from other contexts, the attorney-client privilege
is held by the client, not the attorney, and can be voluntarily waived
without resulting in an ethical breach, so long as the attorney ade-
quately advised the client about the consequences of disclosure. As
demonstrated in a court opinion107 and recent National Counsel for
Professional Responsibility conference discussions,108 it is also possible
for the attorney to waive the attorney-client privilege in the docu-
ments shared with the lender, but still retain work-product privilege
through a confidentiality agreement. What remains unsettled are the
parameters of informed client consent, whether a confidentiality
agreement solves the waiver problem, and the extent to which an at-
torney can advise or dissuade a client about entering into an ALF
agreement.
The ethical problems in commercial litigation are similar to those
in consumer ALF, as demonstrated by Chevron Corp. v. Donziger.109 In
the underlying suit, the plaintiffs’ lead attorney Steven Donziger filed
a class action lawsuit against Texaco on behalf of Ecuadorian Indians
and farmers living near oil wells operated in the 1970’s and 1980’s.110
Chevron became a party to the lawsuit when it acquired Texaco.111
The plaintiff accused the oil company of causing widespread pollution
build/ethics_2020/comments_on_alternative_litigation_financing_issues_paper.auth
checkdam.pdf.
105. See infra Part III.B.
106. See Pardau, supra note 20, at 75 (“Legislation specific to ALFs recently has been
introduced in a few states based on the common interest doctrine. According to the legisla-
tion, the sharing of privileged information between a claimant and an ALF provider does
not waive any applicable privilege.”).
107. See Miller UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc., No. 10 C 03770, 2014 WL 67340, at *16-17
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 2014) (“To avoid the risk of disclosure, Miller took precautions through
confidentiality agreements with at least some prospective funders. . . . It perhaps could be
argued that the assertions that Miller and one or more prospective funders ‘agreed’ and
had an ‘understanding’ regarding confidentiality are merely legal conclusions, and that
therefore the Declaration should not be considered.”).
108. See Commercial Litigation Funding, Ethics, and Law, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://
www.americanbar.org/calendar/2014/05/40th-aba-national-conference-on-professional-
responsibility/conferencematerials/session9.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2014) (presenting
the panel page for the ABA’s 40th National Conference for Professional Responsibility).
109. 974 F. Supp. 2d 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
110. Id. at 383.
111. Id.
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and ill-health to the local population.112 Philadelphia plaintiffs-litiga-
tion firm, Kohn, Swift, & Graf113 and particularly its partner Joseph
Kohn,114 originally funded the case. Additional backers included per-
sonal investors, an international third-party litigation funder,115 and
hedge fund companies.116 When Chevron’s counsel successfully sub-
poenaed the plaintiffs’ funding documents, the funding contract re-
vealed that there were eight tiers of funders.117 In a 485-page ruling, a
verdict in favor of the plaintiffs was overturned.118 The court found
that Donziger engaged in fraud,119 racketeering,120 money launder-
ing,121 wire fraud,122 extortion,123 witness tampering,124 Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act violations,125 and bribery126 in connection with the
funding obtained while pursuing the two-decade long case. The attor-
112. In re Chevron Corp., 633 F.3d 153, 156 (3d Cir. 2011).
113. Chris Mondics, Venerable Center City Law Firm Embroiled in Chevron Fraud Case,
PHILLY.COM (Dec. 23, 2010), http://articles.philly.com/2010-12-23/news/26356087_1_
chevron-request-ecuadorean-steven-donziger; see also William Langewiesche, Jungle Law,
VANITY FAIR (May 2007), http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2007/05/texaco
200705.
114. Daniel Fisher, Chevron Ecuador Case A Shambles, Former Backer Says, FORBES (Dec. 17,
2010), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2010/12/17/chevron-ecuador-case-a-
shambles-former-backer-says.
115. See Daniel Fisher, Poker Magnate, London Firm Bankroll Chevron Plaintiffs, FORBES
(Jan. 27, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2011/01/27/poker-magnate-
london-firm-bankroll-chevron-plaintiffs/.
116. See Roger Parloff, Have You Got a Piece of This Lawsuit?, FORTUNE (June 28, 2011),
http://features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2011/06/28/have-you-got-a-piece-of-this-lawsuit-2/
[hereinafter Parloff, Have You Got a Piece of This Lawsuit?]; Roger Parloff, Litigation Finance
Firm in Chevron Case Says It Was Duped By Patton Boggs, FORTUNE (Apr. 17, 2013), http://
features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2013/04/17/burford-patton-boggs-chevron-suit.
117. See Parloff, Have You Got a Piece of This Lawsuit?, supra note 116; Chevron Corp. v.
Donziger, 974 F. Supp. 2d 362, 576 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“In this case, the LAP team and its
affiliates were a group of persons associated in fact for the common purpose of pursuing
the recovery of money from Chevron via the Lago Agrio litigation, whether by settlement
or by enforceable judgment, coupled with the exertion of pressure on Chevron to pay. The
group included (1) Donziger, (2) the U.S. and Ecuadorian lawyers, including Kohn, Pat-
ton Boggs, and others, (3) Yanza, the ADF, and Selva Viva, (4) the investors who gave
money to finance the operation, usually in exchange for shares of any recovery, (5) the
LAPs’ public relations, media, and lobbying arms, (6) the LAPs’ technical people, includ-
ing Stratus, Beltman, Maest, Russell, Calmbacher, Champ, Quarles, E–Tech, UBR, and
3TM, and (7) others.”).
118. Chevron Corp., 974 F. Supp. 2d at 644.
119. Id. at 560.
120. Id. at 603.
121. Id. at 593.
122. Id. at 590.
123. Id. at 582.
124. Id. at 595.
125. Id. at 598-99.
126. Id. at 596.
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ney-client privilege protecting the requested documents would have
been waived by the crime-fraud exception,127 even though the puta-
tive plaintiffs—the Ecuadorian farmers affected by the oil contamina-
tion—had done no criminal wrong and likely had no idea how the
litigation was being funded.128
The court also attempted to explain the web of third-party fund-
ing backing the plaintiffs’ case, which provided the necessary links to
find the attorney’s actions illegal under anti-racketeering and money-
laundering laws.129 The $18 billion judgment in favor of the plain-
tiffs—later reduced to $9.5 billion—was thrown out. But it is unlikely
that the Ecuadorians would have benefitted much from any monetary
judgment. As of July 2013, Donziger’s fraud defense attorney with-
drew representation because, according to the attorney, Donziger
could no longer pay his bills.130
Although the ethical dilemmas in small, personal injury cases and
larger scale litigation are similar, Chevron emphasizes the additional
potential liabilities a lawyer subjects himself to when using extensive
amounts of funding to pursue a big case.
III. Defenses by the Third-Party Litigation Funders
A. High Risks Associated with Providing Funding
One of the strongest arguments in support of ALF is that third-
party litigation funders provide money to people who would not oth-
erwise have the funds to support themselves while prosecuting a law-
suit. However, this is not the only type of cliental third-party litigation
funders serve, as such funding assisted the lawyers prosecuting the re-
cent civil BP oil cases.131 On the ALFA website, the funders argue that,
127. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(2) (2013) (“A lawyer may reveal infor-
mation relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably be-
lieves necessary . . . to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is
reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of
another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer’s services.”).
128. See William E. Thomson & Armen Adzhemyan, Litigating the Crime-Fraud Exception:
Chevron Corp. v. Donzinger, INSIDE COUNSEL (Aug. 25, 2014), http://www.insidecounsel
.com/2014/08/25/litigating-the-crime-fraud-exception-ichevron-corp.
129. Chevron Corp., 974 F. Supp. 2d at 575-617.
130. Clifford Krauss, Lawyer Who Beat Chevron in Ecuador Faces Trial of His Own, N.Y.
TIMES (July 30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/31/business/steven-donziger-
lawyer-who-beat-chevron-in-ecuador-faces-trial-of-his-own.html?hp&_r=1&.
131. See BP Gulf Oil Spill Lawsuit Funding, LAWSUIT LOANS FUNDING, http://
www.lawsuitloansfundings.com/BP-gulf-oil-spill (last visited Sept. 29, 2014); Legal Funding
for BP Oil Spill Plaintiffs’ Attorneys, RD LEGAL FUNDING, http://www.legalfunding.com/eligi
ble-cases/bp-oil-spill-legal-funding/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2014).
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on average, they only charge 10% of the “estimated net value of the
case,”132 creating the appearance that upon completion the borrower
receives more than the lender regains on the loan principle, fees, and
interest.
ALF supporters also justify their funding model by emphasizing
their willingness to accept large amounts of risk. ALF loans are non-
recourse, because the funders recoup nothing if there is no recov-
ery.133 But if there is any recovery, they take a substantial amount.134
Loans must comply with usury laws, which typically set maximum in-
terest rates.135 ALF loans typically exceed these rates, despite being
technically nonrecourse. ALFA argues that these non-recourse loans
and their interest rates are high because of the elevated risk the third-
party litigation funder assumes by issuing a non-recourse loan.136 For
example, if the borrower loses the case, the lender cannot recover. To
avoid complying with states’ usury laws, third-party litigation funders
argue that they are not subject to the laws because they are making an
investment rather than a loan, essentially placing a bet on the success-
ful outcome of a litigation action.137 To further justify the high inter-
est rates and fees, third-party litigation funders contend that a typical
car or home loan is secured by tangible property and is not nearly as
risky as an investment in a lawsuit, which has no tangible collateral
and no guaranteed outcome.138 They claim to be entitled to a usuri-
ously high annual interest rate because of the significant risk.139
However, lots of normal transactions, such as buying stock, always
pose a risk due to the unpredictability of the market. When passen-
gers get on an airplane flight and the plane crashes due to a faulty
engine repair, they will certainly receive compensation from some
party, whether it is the airline or the plane manufacturer.140 Com-
132. Frequently Asked Questions, AM. LEGAL FINANCE ASS’N, http://www.americanlegalfin
.com/faq.asp (last visited Sept. 29, 2014).
133. See id.
134. See Langford, supra note 24.
135. See 44B AM. JUR. 2D Interest and Usury § 91 (2007) (“A usury statute may impose a
requirement that the lender ‘charge’ or ‘demand’ usurious interest as an element of
usury.”).
136. See Frequently Asked Questions, AM. LEGAL FINANCE ASS’N, supra note 132.
137. See ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, Informational Report to the House of Dele-
gates, at 12 (2011).
138. See Steinitz, supra note 9, at 491 (“In the case of litigation funding, the litigation is
usually at an early stage and discovery of facts is preliminary at best.”).
139. See ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, Informational Report to the House of Dele-
gates, at 12-13.
140. D.E. Buckner, Annotation, Air Carrier as Common or Private Carrier, and Resulting
Duties as to Passenger’s Safety, 73 A.L.R.2d 358 (1960) (“A common carrier of passengers for
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pared to the risks in these everyday transactions, the risk in investing
in litigation is not substantial, especially when the lender funds a case
after discovery closes.141
B. Third-Party Litigation Funders are No Different than Insurance
Companies
Third-party litigation funders also assert that they are no different
than an insurance company funded by a pool of law firms to provide
defense of malpractice suits.142 Defendants’ insurance companies that
take on the burden of litigation and require the cooperation of the
insured have long funded defense-side litigation.143 ALF advocates in
scholarship state that there is no great difference between liability in-
surance in litigation and ALF, and that the concerns over the legal
ethics of ALF are misplaced.144 However, the essential difference be-
tween ALF and other kinds of funding is that insurance companies
are highly regulated.145 ALF is not regulated,146 and insurance compa-
nies do not charge 40% annual interest to people already hurt and
entitled to seek civil damages.147
Finally, third-party litigation funders contend that the funding
agreements are tailored to the needs of the specific case, making it
difficult to regulate.148 In reality, the agreements are not truly be-
hire by air is ordinarily said to be under a duty to exercise either a high or the highest
degree of care for the safety of its passengers.”). A plane crash resulting in injury would be
a breach of that duty of care, and make the common air carrier liable for any damages
suffered by the passengers. See id. at 362. Additionally, if the tort was due to a product
defect in the plane, the manufacturer would be liable under strict liability. See id.
141. Provided that nothing legally precludes funders from offering their services at any
time. Just as there are no laws directly regulating ALF, there is no regulation of how or
when the client and the third-party litigation funder may enter into an agreement. Con-
sumers are allowed to freely enter into agreements with private companies.
142. See, e.g., Steven Gillers, Waiting for Good Dough, 43 AKRON L. REV. 677, 681 (2010).
143. See Steinitz, supra note 9, at 490; Michelle Boardman, Insurers Defend and Third
Parties Fund: A Comparison of Litigation Participation, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 673, 686 (2012).
144. See Charles Silver, Litigation Funding Versus Liability Insurance: What’s the Difference?,
63 DEPAUL L. REV. 617, 618 (2014); Michele DeStefano, Nonlawyers Influencing Lawyers: Too
Many Cooks in the Kitchen or Stone Soup?, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2791, 2838-40 (2012).
145. See 54A AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies and Restraints of Trade § 808 (2009). See generally
FEDERAL INSURANCE OFFICE, U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, HOW TO MODERNIZE AND IMPROVE




146. See supra text accompanying note 22.
147. Langford, supra note 24.
148. ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, Informational Report to the House of Delegates,
at 3 (2011).
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spoke; typical template provisions underlie each transaction. These
template provisions (1) charge a usurious interest rate on the loan
when calculated for annual compound interest and additional obliga-
tory fees;149 (2) allow the funder to discontinue future funding at any
point if the litigation is not going as expected,150 placing the client at
the risk of losing control or being forced to abandon litigation; (3)
allow the funder to force the client and lawyer to arbitrate settlements
to give the funder assurance of the return on investment,151 or con-
versely disincentivize settlement due to the terms of the loan;152 (4)
contain provisions that can adequately control the course of the
case;153 (5) allow information sharing by the funder with other inves-
tors, waiving the attorney-client relationship;154 and (6) have negative
covenants that disallow the plaintiff to execute any documents that
might reduce the value of the funder’s investment.155
IV. Promising ALF Regulatory Solutions
If ALF is similar to other types of financing already allowed in
litigation—contingency fee agreements, third-party funding, and in-
surance—ALF arguably should be allowed in litigation as well. Like
these other forms of funding, in ALF, the client agrees to give up
some privilege or part of the damages awarded in exchange for fund-
ing to pursue or defend a legal claim. The flaw in this argument is that
ALF sufficiently differs from these other types of funding. ALF has not
been clearly regulated by the federal government, state governments,
state bar associations, the ABA, or the courts. The preamble of the
ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct states that it is a lawyer’s
149. See Langford, supra note 24.
150. Steinitz, supra note 9, at 504.
151. See Jason Lyon, Revolution in Progress: Third-Party Funding of American Litigation, 58
UCLA L. REV. 571, 602 (2010). “The funder directed the prosecution of the case and
retained the authority to decide when and whether to settle.” Id.
152. See Douglas R. Richmond, Other People’s Money: The Ethics of Litigation Funding, 56
MERCER L. REV. 649, 657 (2005) (discussing Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding
Corp., 789 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 2003)).
153. Steinitz, supra note 9, at 508 (“Applying this insight to litigation funding, one
could envision a recognized role for the litigation financiers in the day-to-day management
of the litigation. Such a role can include the raising of additional funds, helping in formu-
lating legal tactics and litigation strategy, and assisting in structuring the ultimate settle-
ment agreement in the same manner as VCFs help structure key deals executed by
portfolio companies.”).
154. See Leader Technologies, Inc. v. Facebook, 719 F. Supp. 2d 373, 376 (D. Del.
2010) (holding that information sharing with a third party investor waived the attorney-
client privilege).
155. Steinitz, supra note 9, at 509.
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responsibility to serve as an advisor and advocate for the client.156 A
lawyer’s job is not just to help clients after they get into legal trouble,
but also to warn clients and the public about legal risks before such
problems arise. The lack of guidance, combined with the opportunity
for predatory actions on vulnerable and under-informed clients in
ALF, creates a dangerous atmosphere that a prudent lawyer should
not enter. When funders and lawyers have the potential to leave the
injured client with little recovery from his suit, then it is time to imple-
ment regulation and guidance from both lawmakers and state bar
associations.
A. Contracting Solutions
1. Language in Attorney-Client Agreements
Although not specifically about ALF, the State Bar of California
Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct’s
(COPRAC) 1994 Opinion (the “COPRAC Opinion”) regarding struc-
tured settlements touches on the same personal financial interest con-
cern regarding attorney-client transactions that arise in the ALF
context.157 The COPRAC Opinion advises the following:
The best protection for both Attorney and Client against the anom-
alies presented by a settlement offer that may put Client and Attor-
ney at odds may be the inclusion, per Business and Professions
Code section 6147 (a)(2), of language which recognizes and antici-
pates these situations and discusses how they will be dealt with
when they arise, thus fully amplifying in the fee agreement how
Attorney’s fee and Client’s recovery are interrelated.158
Pursuant to the California Rules of Professional Conduct gov-
erning attorney-client transactions, the terms of any agreement that is
reached between the attorney and client must be “fair and reasonable
to client.”159 Currently, this is the best and clearest guidance given to
attorneys to steer themselves through the multifaceted field of litiga-
tion financing because it relies on the generally understood and com-
mon mechanism of the fee agreement. Ahead of the client entering
into a separate ALF financing agreement, the attorney can contract
with the client to protect both herself and the client’s interests in the
litigation.
156. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble & Scope, ¶ 2 (2013).
157. Cal. State Bar Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op.
1994-135 (1994).
158. Id.
159. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3-300(A) (2013).
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2. Contracts Between the Attorney, Client, and the Third-Party
Litigation Funder
There are fundamental differences between consumer ALF and
commercial ALF.160 Guidance on how to operate within each differs
due to the types of clients involved and the reasons for obtaining the
financing. However, contract law does not differentiate between con-
sumer and commercial contracts, and there are common, fundamen-
tal ethical issues underlying both.161 Guidance on one will inevitably
cross over to the other as the ALF field grows.
Maya Steinitz writes extensively on litigation financing, and her
scholarship focuses, in part, on structural solutions for commercial lit-
igation.162 Steinitz proposes that litigation funders act like venture
capitalists that are involved in a similar relationship between the
lender and borrower.163 This association is a contractual investment
relationship, with funding tiered at important points in the litigation
process.164 Importantly, her scheme for commercial litigation funding
relies on transparency in both contractual terms and with regard to
the investment-litigation’s likelihood of success.165 This funding
model combines the plaintiff-funder relationship with the attorney-
client relationship through a funder-inclusive, attorney-client arrange-
ment contract.166
This tri-partite negotiation has the potential, in both commercial
and consumer litigation funding, to address the issues created by cli-
ents waiving the attorney-client privilege and unknowingly ceding con-
trol of the litigation contractually. This type of agreement between
client, attorney, and funder should be required before litigation
financers can claim a stake in the award or settlement. Attorneys
would have an opportunity to investigate the terms of the ALF con-
tract, advise their clients about risks and options, increase bargaining
transparency, and increase the client’s bargaining power with the
funders. As a result, delayed realizations of what was exchanged for
funding would be avoided.167
160. See supra text accompanying notes 13-15.
161. See Christina L. Kunz, The Ethics of Invalid and “Iffy” Contract Clauses, 40 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 487, 488-90 (2006) (identifying five factual scenarios that raise ethical issues during
the process of negotiating terms of a contract).
162. Steinitz, supra note 9, at 455.
163. Id. at 488-90.
164. Id. at 501-14.
165. Id. at 514.
166. Id. at 515-16.
167. See supra Part II.
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Importantly, attorneys can control the way third-party litigation
funders operate and negotiate with clients by building retainer agree-
ments that require negotiated financing terms. These retainer agree-
ments prevent clients from unknowingly jeopardizing their long-term
interests, and binding the attorney to cumbersome third-party con-
tract agreements. Julia McLaughlin explains that an agreement cre-
ated to account for a third-party litigation funder’s presence would
insulate the attorney-client relationship from any potential intermed-
dling.168 Therefore, any party who breaches the agreement would be
held accountable through the enforcement of contract or tort law
principles.169
Additionally, the already regulated and existing attorney-client
trust account170 can also be used to protect the client from any poten-
tial predation by third-party litigation funders. Any award or settle-
ment funds, just as in the current system, should be held in a trust
account and released to the funder only on the client’s authorization.
An attorney’s duty of loyalty should preclude any conflicting contrac-
tual interests or agreements between the funder and the attorney.
B. Treat Third-Party Litigation Funders like Other Funders or
Insurance Companies
As discussed earlier, ALF advocates view the client-attorney-
funder relationship similarly to litigation where the insurance com-
pany assumes the case away from the client.171 However, there are
noteworthy differences. The insurance relationship begins before liti-
gation, and its primary purpose is not an investment venture.172 In
both ALF and insurance contexts, once funding is accepted, the client
assumes a duty to cooperate with the funder, and the funder has a
168. Julia H. McLaughlin, Litigation Funding: Charting a Legal and Ethical Course, 31 VT.
L. REV. 615, 657-58 (2007).
169. See Anthony J. Sebok & W. Bradley Wendell, Duty in the Litigation-Investment Agree-
ment: The Choice Between Tort and Contract Norms When the Deal Breaks Down, 66 VAND. L. REV.
1831, 1859-60 (2013) (“The economic loss rule denies recovery in negligence for a finan-
cial loss that is not causally connected to personal injury or property damage suffered by
the same plaintiff.” (internal quotations omitted)).
170. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4-100(A) (2013) (“All funds received or held
for the benefit of clients by a member or law firm, including advances for costs and ex-
penses, shall be deposited in one or more identifiable bank accounts labeled ‘Trust Ac-
count,’ ‘Client’s Funds Account’ or words of similar import . . . . No funds belonging to the
member or the law firm shall be deposited therein or otherwise commingled
therewith . . . .”).
171. See supra Part III.B.
172. See Boardman, supra note 143, at 681.
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present and sometimes controlling interest in the litigation. The in-
surance company becomes a co-client of the attorney at the principle
client’s allowance.173 Nothing ethically prevents a third-party litigation
funder from being involved as a co-client if, as advocates argue, the
interests are actually non-conflicting and the principle client gives in-
formed consent.174 Perhaps the ethical issues would be ameliorated if
the litigation funder were treated as if it were simply another third-
party funder, clearly bound by client-controlled and attorney-advised
terms regarding privilege and litigation control.
C. Attorney Litigation Financing
If regulation of ALF is beyond the scope of the state bar associa-
tions, and attorneys are unable to wield sufficient contractual clout
over third-party litigation funders to protect individual clients, one al-
ternative is to change the professional ethics rules to allow attorneys
to loan clients funds for living expenses.175 Data shows that consumer
litigation funding is not primarily used to pay the attorney or legal
costs (which are usually already covered by the contingency system),
but rather to provide for the client’s living expenses during litiga-
tion.176 If the legal profession is ethically threatened by the unregu-
lated ALF industry catering to the clients’ needs, then perhaps the
legal profession should allow attorneys to make loans to their clients
to ensure internal regulation of attorney-client relations, as well as the
internal regulation of this type of lending. This structure ensures reg-
ulation because attorneys are still bound by the duty of loyalty to their
clients, unlike third-party litigation funders who make these deals
solely for commercial gain.
D. Legislation and Regulation
1. The Parallels with State Regulation of Payday Lending
Payday lending is a type of short-term, high-interest rate, con-
sumer loan that is an advance paid back from the consumer’s next
paycheck.177 These loans are technically non-recourse because the col-
173. Discussion of the ethical guidelines and rules governing attorneys working with
insurance companies is beyond the scope of this Article.
174. Silver, supra note 144, at 627 (“Nothing prevents a funder, a plaintiff, and a con-
tingent fee lawyer from agreeing that the funder will be a co-client.”).
175. See McLaughlin, supra note 168, at 660-61.
176. Id. at 620.
177. Alex Kaufman, Payday Lending Regulation 5 (Federal Reserve Board, Finance and
Economics Discussion Series, Staff Working Paper No. 2013-62), available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2013/201362/201362pap.pdf.
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lateral is only the borrower’s next paycheck or access to the bor-
rower’s checking account for the amount of the loan.178 The fees on
the amount borrowed are such that the annual percentage rate (APR)
on amounts borrowed can be between 300-500% of the principal.179
Much like ALF,180 the research on payday loans shows that the major-
ity of borrowers use the funds to cover ordinary, reoccurring expenses
(e.g., rent, groceries, etc.) rather than extraordinary, unexpected
expenses.181
Payday loans are not directly regulated by the federal govern-
ment, although their activity does sometimes fall within the purview of
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Truth in Lending Act,182 Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act,183 and may be regulated in the future
by the recently created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.184
Otherwise, individual states regulate the payday loan industry, which
results in differing regulatory systems and requirements.185 Similar to
ALFA, the payday loan industry established its own member organiza-
tion, the Community Financial Services Association of America. This
organization is self-regulated—also through “Best Practices” guide-
lines186—and focuses on protecting its members’ interests.187
Much like ALF, payday lending is perceived as one kind of lend-
ing system when, in actuality, it is a variety of lending products, vary-
178. See id.
179. Id.; see also Payday Lending, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/
media-resources/consumer-finance/payday-lending (last visited Sept. 29, 2014).
180. See Garber, supra note 10, at 12.
181. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, PAYDAY LENDING IN AMERICA: WHO BORROWS, WHERE
THEY BORROW, AND WHY 13-14 (July 2012), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media
/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2012/PewPaydayLendingReportpdf.pdf.
182. Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1601 (2012)); Payday Lending, FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 179; Kaufman, supra note
177, at 4.
183. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (1977) (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2012)).
184. CFPB OFFICE OF RESEARCH, CFPD DATA POINT: PAYDAY LENDING (Mar. 2014), avail-
able at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201403_cfpb_report_payday-lending.pdf.
185. See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, STATE PAYDAY LOAN REGULATION AND USAGE RATES
(July 2012), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/multimedia/data-visualizations/
2014/~/media/Data%20Visualizations/Interactives/2014/State%20Payday%20Loan%20
Regulation%20and%20Usage%20Rates/Report/State_Payday_Loan_Regulation_and_
Usage_Rates.pdf; Kaufman, supra note 177, at Appendix A.
186. CFSA Member Best Practices, CMTY. FIN. SERVS. ASS’N OF AM., http://cfsaa.com/cfsa-
member-best-practices.aspx (last visited Sept. 29, 2014).
187. See CMTY. FIN. SERVS. ASS’N OF AM., http://www.cfsa.net (last visited Sept. 29, 2014)
(“We believe consumers deserve choices with simple, understandable loan terms and to be
treated fairly throughout the process.”).
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ing in price, size, duration, and consumer use.188 These different
types of products call for varying types of regulatory applications,
some of which can be carried over to ALF regulation. Two types of
transferable regulation currently used by the states are price caps,
which cap the APR charged, and size caps, which limit the maximum
size of a payday loan.189 Some states use price caps to prohibit payday
lending by setting the APR cap too low for the lender to operate prof-
itably.190 Size caps limit the amount of debt that the borrower can
assume.191 Illinois is an example of a state that implemented loan lim-
its in its Payday Loan Reform Act,192 and combines limits on fees and
the maximum amount borrowed.193 Under Illinois law, no lender may
make a loan that exceeds $1,000, 25% of the consumer’s gross
monthly income, or charge more than $15.50 per $100 loaned.194 A
lender is also prohibited from taking an interest in any of the consum-
ers’s personal property to secure the loan.195
If states can pass laws regulating payday loans in the interest of
consumer protection, they should also be able to pass legislation regu-
lating ALF as another type of high-interest, small-amount consumer
loan. Capping the amount third-party litigation funders can receive
from final settlements or awards has already been suggested. Data sug-
gests consumer ALF is being used by client-consumers to finance liv-
ing expenses—unlike commercial litigation, where ALF is used to
fund only litigation efforts.196 There does not appear to be any genu-
ine difference between the types of consumers obtaining payday loans
and ALF. However, ALF differs in that the loan is made in the context
of litigation and implicates parties having an attorney-client relation-
ship. State regulation of small, loan-related consumer ALF might ef-
fectively solve the attorney’s “moral hazard” issues of intermeddling
with the client’s interest and control over the course of litigation and
settlement. Capping or controlling the amount that a third-party liti-
gation funder collects may reduce the conflicting interests in deciding
whether to settle or proceed with litigation.
188. See Kaufman, supra note 177, at 3.
189. Id. at 6.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 122 (2012).
193. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 122/2-5(e) (2012).
194. Id.
195. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 122/2-5(f) (2012).
196. See McLaughlin, supra note 168, at 659.
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2. Federal Regulation of Non-Recourse Lending and Attorney
Advocacy
If ALF develops to be less like payday loans and more like the
non-recourse funding, then it falls under the regulatory power of the
FTC, and potentially under the Consumer Financial Protection Bu-
reau.197 The third-party litigation funders, specifically consumer-litiga-
tion funders, follow the applicable federal laws concerning non-
recourse loans, and hope to either avoid or shape federal laws about
further regulation, as demonstrated by ALFA’s active presence.198
However, federal consumer financing regulation is surprisingly thin,
covering broad, but shallow, aspects of the litigation funding industry.
Thus, the legal profession must stress the ethical concerns to federal
lawmakers and explain the impact of ALF in its current form on the
legal profession.
Alternatively, if third-party litigation funders claim that they are
investing—or gambling199—in litigation, and therefore entitled to
charge high fees and interest rates, then the activity is arguably gov-
erned by the same rules as venture capital funds that pool capital to
invest in securities.200 Private venture capital investments under $150
million, however, are exempt from the Investment Advisers Act regu-
lations as part of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act.201 It appears that SEC regulation of ALF
activities would occur only if the investment interests in cases were
pooled together and sold, resulting in insider trading, market manip-
ulation, or accounting issues.202
Conclusion
There are several ethics opinions from various states on litigation
funding, but they fail to address the prescient issues. COPRAC’s For-
mal Opinion 2002-159 trends in the ALF-regulation direction, but in-
volves a lawyer advising the client to acquire a traditional loan in the
197. See supra Part IV.D.1.
198. See supra Part II.A.
199. See Anthony J. Sebok, Betting on Torts Suits After the Event: From Champerty to Insur-
ance, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 453, 456 (2011).
200. Steinitz, supra note 9, at 480.
201. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (2012); Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1575 (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 80b (2012)).
202. Harvey L. Pitt et al., SEC Enforcement Actions: An Overview of SEC Enforcement Proceed-
ings and Priorities, C700 ALI-ABA 167, 200 (1991).
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form of a mortgage on the client’s house to finance the litigation.203
Los Angeles County Bar Association Formal Opinion 500 involves a
lawyer going into the business of financing, and becoming a funder
on a case in which he is not involved.204 The closest to reaching the
ethical issues presented by ALF is COPRAC’s Formal Opinion 1994-
135 regarding structured settlements, stating that a lawyer cannot take
his fee in a way that defeats the very purpose of the client’s desire to
settle.205
With no real guidance, lawyers must conduct themselves with the
utmost care when referring a client to a litigation funder or when
seeking funding themselves. Lawyers should specifically explain to cli-
ents the issues that can arise from obtaining a loan having a com-
pounding interest rate. An attorney must also discuss the potential
discoverability of otherwise privileged statements and documents, as
well as the ramifications if the client provides the statements and doc-
uments to a funder. In addition, potential conflicts of interest must be
explored and consented to prior to discovering that any settlement
offer would not cover both the funding and attorney’s costs.
This Article proposes numerous potential solutions intended to
curb the ethical dilemmas ALF presents to attorneys. First, contractual
solutions could be implemented that combine the plaintiff-funder
and attorney-client relationship to facilitate transparency and in-
formed negotiation among all interested parties. Alternatively, third-
party litigation funders could be treated similar to insurance compa-
nies that cannot become involved in the litigation without explicit cli-
ent consent. Finally, states or the federal government could pass
legislation capping the amount a particular lawsuit could receive us-
ing ALF. State bar associations create regulations in which attorneys
must abide to ensure the legal system functions as intended. However,
when a practice develops that noticeably challenges these fundamen-
tal ethical tenents, it cannot merely be discussed in nonbinding opin-
ions, but must be appropriately regulated.
203. Cal. State Bar Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op.
2002-159 (2002).
204. L.A. Cnty. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Responsibility & Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 500
(1999).
205. Cal. State Bar Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op.
1994-135 (1994).
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